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Abstract
TINA species an open architecture for telecommunication services in the
broadband, multimedia, and information era. Its characteristics most rele-
vant for security are a variety of services, a multitude of service providers, a
well dened business model, a middleware platform for service development
and provision, and the assumption of advanced costumer premises equipment.
Concepts for its security architecture are developed in the CrySTINA project.
We introduce the TINA-C architecture, analyse it with regard to security and
present the CrySTINA security architecture. CrySTINA is aligned with the
OMG's CORBA Security specication, but enhances it with regard to security
interoperability despite the heterogeneity of security policies and technologies
that must be expected in TINA networks. Thus, we present a model for the
enforcement of security policies that supports the negotiation of security con-
texts.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Computers are increasingly used for the control of telecommunication systems.
The use of computers enables more exibility in control as well as the fast
and cheap introduction of new telecommunication services. The basic ideas
for this approach stem from the Intelligent Network (Garrahan et al. 1993)
(Magedanz and Popescu-Zeletin 1996). Network and service control func-
tions of these networks are more and more realized as software. TINA, which
stands for Telecommunications Information Networking Architecture (Dupuy
et al. 1995), takes these developments even further. It is currently the most
encompassing eort to dene an open architecture for telecommunication ser-
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2vices implemented as distributed applications in the emerging broadband,
multimedia and information era. This eort is carried out by the TINA Con-
sortium (TINA-C), a multinational consortium consisting of major network
operators, as well as telecommunication equipment and computer system sup-
pliers (Barr et al. 1993). The software model of TINA is based on the concept
of distributed object computing.
TINA reects several developments, which cause security problems that
are new to the traditional telecommunications world. The diminishing cost
of transmission bandwidth enables distributed multimedia real-time applica-
tions. The powerful Costumer Premises Equipment (CPE) available due to
the progressive use of computing technology on the user's side enables a mul-
titude of services to be delivered via a common telecommunication infrastruc-
ture to multipurpose end-user terminals. The worldwide deregulation of the
telecommunication environment creates an open market for the provision of
telecommunication services. Thus, telecommunication networks are not only
populated by a multitude of users but also by a multitude of service providers.
The cooperation and, at the same time, competition of various providers in
the same physical network, as well as the expected signicance of the net-
work acting as the infrastructure for services varying from teleconferencing
and video-on-demand to electronic commerce and electronic banking raise a
strong demand for security and privacy of service usage and communication.
The security problem domain requires a thorough analysis of the network
as a whole. In the end, a security infrastructure that belongs to the network
must fulll the security requirements of all available types of services. The im-
plementation of this infrastructure is closely coupled to the concept of middle-
ware, which decouples the service implementation from the underlying hard-
ware. It is conceivable that the middleware in TINA will be based on products
conforming to the Common Object Request Broker Architecture (CORBA)
specied by the OMG (OMG 1995 1). Important aspects with regard to secu-
rity are the self-administration of the domains (including security) and thus
the probable heterogeneity of their security policies and security technologies.
Both require the negotiation of security contexts to enable secure interactions
between domains.
In the CrySTINA project, we develop a security architecture for TINA that
is aligned to the CORBA security architecture, but additionally supports the
negotiation of security contexts. In this article, we present this architecture
and the rationale behind it. Section 2 introduces the TINA-C architecture
focusing on the security relevant aspects. In Section 3, we analyse TINA with
regard to security and propose the vertical allocation of the security func-
tionality to the middleware layer, which is provided by CORBA. Thus, we
introduce the CORBA security specications in Section 4. In Section 5, we
present the CrySTINA security architecture. Section 6 describes an imple-
mentation of its model for the enforcement of security. Section 7 summarizes
the work presented and gives an outlook on our ongoing and further work.
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Familiarity with TINA is not required, while knowledge about CORBA and
security concepts is assumed.
2 THE TINA-C ARCHITECTURE
In TINA, services are realized as distributed applications. They consist of
service components that interact with each other via a Distributed Processing
Environment (DPE). The DPE is a software sub-layer that operates above the
Native Computing and Communications Environment (NCCE), which is an
abstraction of the computing hardware and the operating system of the service
nodes. While the NCCE is technology dependent, the DPE oers a uniform
interface to the distributed environment. The DPE will consist of CORBA
implementations as the DPE kernel and additional TINA specic services.
Components in the application layer are divided into three categories; ser-
vice components, resource components, and elements. Service components ad-
dress the service logic, service access, and service management. Services can
make use of common resources by interacting with resource components. The
resource components are high-level abstractions of available resources, which
enable the usage and the management of these resources in a technology inde-
pendent way. Elements are software representations of individual networking
and computing resources, such as transmission equipment, switches, or com-
puters. Figure 1 shows the layering into applications, DPE, and NCCE, as
well as the structuring of the application layer into component categories.
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Figure 1 TINA overall architecture
The concepts for how service components are specied and how they inter-
act are provided by the Computing Architecture. It denes the DPE as the
computer and communication platform support and provides the computa-
4tional modelling concepts, such as the Object Description Language (ODL),
which is a superset of CORBA's IDL. Service components consist of compu-
tational objects (COs) or CO groups. COs can have two kinds of interfaces:
operational interfaces, which are comparable to object interfaces in CORBA,
and stream interfaces, which are designed to convey an arbitrary sequence of
bytes between two components (e.g., audio or video bit streams). Messages
from and to the operational interfaces are exchanged via the Kernel Transport
Network (KTN), whereas streams are transferred via the Transport Network.
TINA has a general business model with various roles: the supermarket. The
following roles for stakeholders are identied: Consumer, Retailer, Third Party
Service Provider, Connectivity Provider, and Broker. Consumers buy services
from Retailers, but the actual services are provided by third Party Service
Providers. Connectivity Providers oer the necessary connectivity (streams)
for the transport of content information between stakeholders. The Broker
acts as a kind of yellow page and white page service (i.e., it delivers references
for services that can be described by service characteristics but also by names
of providers).
Each stakeholder has its own administrative domain and can act in one or
more roles. Any arbitrarily complex relationship for service use is composed
of simple two-party user-provider relationships. A user-provider relationship
contains two types of interaction: access and usage. The access part is con-
cerned with the establishment of a trusted and reliable temporary relationship
between the user domain and the provider domain that is a prerequisite for
usage interactions. Interoperability between domains is guaranteed by the
denition of interdomain reference points. Figure 2 shows the business model
with the dened roles and reference points.
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Figure 2 TINA business model
The traditional call concept of telecommunications is substituted by the
more exible session concept. At the service control level, there are access
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sessions and service sessions (the latter concerned with the service usage). For
contents delivery, a communication session controlled by the service session is
responsible for establishing and maintaining the necessary stream connections.
The service session represents the instances of service usages and the state of
the service logic. Exactly one provider is involved in a service session, but one
or more users participate in it. Before being able to participate in a service
session, each user must establish an access session with the provider. This is
comparable with a login session on a multiuser computer.
Sessions and other information objects are mapped onto service compo-
nents. Service control is achieved by the interaction of service components in
the administrative domains of the users and the provider. Figure 3 shows the
service components in their administrative domains and their relation to dif-
ferent sessions using the example of a video conference with two participants.
For a full description of all service components, we refer to (TINA 1997) or
(Staamann and Wilhelm 1997).
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Figure 3 TINA service architecture
Most relevant for security are the service components for the access session,
namely the Provider Agent (PA) in the user domain, as well as the Initial
Agent (IA) and the User Agent (UA) in the provider domain, since authenti-
cation takes place between these components. The UA represents the user in
the provider domain. It is the user's contact point to start or resume a service
session. In order to interact with its UA (i.e., to have an access session), the
user contacts the IA using the PA. The IA is the initial contact point of the
provider for all users. Authentication between the user and the provider is
then performed between the PA and the IA as part of the establishment of
the access session. After the authentication, a reference to the UA is delivered
6to the PA. Additionally, a security association for further interactions between
service session related service components should have been established.
3 SECURITY ANALYSIS
Security concerns all parts of a TINA system; it is pervasive and cannot be ad-
dressed in isolation. To cope with this complexity, it is necessary to structure
the security problem domain in an appropriate way. All services and resources
may be the subject to attacks. Attacks may be the illegitimate use of compo-
nents or the modication of data, state, or programs. They may occur through
direct access to systems, data, or services from outside or through modication
of messages exchanged between interacting components. Potential attackers
are outsiders, but also other stakeholders in the TINA network. Motives of
attackers may be the illegitimate use of services, fraud (in online businesses,
as well as with regard to the charging of service use), eavesdropping on and
observation of consumers or providers, or the deliberate prevention of service
provision (denial of service attack). The ultimate goal of an attack may be
achieved directly or indirectly. In the latter case, an attacker may install a
backdoor during a rst successful attack, which enables him later on (and
possibly at multiple times) the actually intended misuse. We structure the
security problem domain according to two criteria: the architectural levels de-
ned in the overall architecture, and the type of information (the network used
for the transport), i.e., control messages (KTN) or communication contents
(Transport Network). We identied the following subdomains of the security
problem domain:
 System Security shall ensure that systems, mainly the hardware and
the operating system, are not subject to intrusions or modications. This
concerns networking resources (e.g., network switches) and computing re-
sources. It also includes the NCCE (operating system and communication
ports), since intrusions may not only occur over communication ports of the
NCCE that are used by the DPE, but also over other ports of the NCCE.
The latter point concerns mainly the administrative domains of end users
(consumers) whose CPE (e.g., PCs or workstations) cannot be assumed to
be exclusively used as the endpoint of the TINA network.
 Service Security is mainly concerned with the preservation of the in-
tegrity of service control. Service control includes, among others, the veri-
cation of whether a user is allowed to use a service (subscription) and the
accounting for billing purposes. Both rely on the authenticated identity of
the user. This must be supported by a protocol for authentication of the
user. The integrity of service control includes integrity of subscription ver-
ication and accounting. Access to the service functionality is controlled
at two levels, the DPE level and the service level. At the DPE level, a
coarse-grained access control based on the authenticated identities of the
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users involved in a session prevents attempts by others to invoke oper-
ations of the service components involved in the session. At the service
level, the service logic implemented in the service component controls the
access to service specic information and functionality based on the au-
thenticated identities, context, and state information (authorization). In-
tegrity and condentiality of the messages exchanged between the service
components via operational interfaces must be achieved by the activation
of the appropriate features of the DPE security services. These features
must provide not only the protection of the integrity of the messages and
their order but also protection against interruption of the control connec-
tion itself through interception of all messages up from a certain moment
(Staamann and Wilhelm 1997).
 DPE Security is mainly concerned with the prevention of illegal access
to service components as well as the protection of transmitted messages
containing arguments, results, and exceptions of object invocations and
notications. DPE node security also provides the means to audit and
report security relevant events on the node according to the audit speci-
cations dened by the administrator. DPE security includes the security
of the DPE implementation and its basic services. Since our architectural
placement of security functionality allocates the general security services
and mechanisms to the DPE (see Section5), also the security of the security
services themselves is part of DPE security.
 Communication Contents Security is concerned with the authenticity,
integrity, and condentiality of the service contents information. Since all
service content information in TINA is delivered in the form of streams, it
deals only with streams. Streams are protected using cryptographic mecha-
nisms, preferably stream ciphers (Rueppel 1986) (Schneier 1996) or special
ciphers for certain information formats (e.g., voice or video data). If the
service implemented in the provider's domain does not require any modi-
cation of the stream between two users, they can have end-to-end security.
Otherwise, only user-provider security can be provided. The management
of the necessary keys is part of the service control.
The most important criterion for the horizontal allocation of security func-
tionality is: who administers a domain and the security functionality installed
in the domain and has the physical control over both. In TINA, each stake-
holder in the network has its own administrative domain. We make the as-
sumption that the administrative domain is the trust domain of the stake-
holder. This assumption is based on the fact that in the regular case the
installed hardware is under the physical control of the stakeholder and the
software is installed by the stakeholder. Thus, we assume complete trust be-
tween the stakeholder and its current administrative domain. Security within
the administrative domain (intradomain security) is domain specic and is
achieved by local means (e.g., operating system security measures). Within
8its own domain, the stakeholder trusts in the correctness of the installed
software. Towards the outside, the administrative domain must be protected
against illegitimate access. For interactions with other domains (interdomain
interactions), limited trust relationships must be established. The communi-
cation channels between domains cannot be assumed to be secure. Protection
must be achieved by cryptographic means. In order to be generally applica-
ble but also controllable by the applications, the security functionality has to
be independent from the applications above and the supplier specic NCCE
below. Thus, the natural vertical allocation is the DPE. That means, it has
to be aligned with the DPE implementation (i.e., CORBA). Horizontally, we
allocate the necessary security functionality and the responsibility for its ad-
ministration to each domain and the corresponding stakeholder. This decision
must be supported by an appropriate scheme of security identities. The se-
curity identities have to be the identities of the stakeholders (their domains),
which are specied in the TINA naming framework. All objects in a domain
must act to the outside under the identity of their domain. From the security
point of view, the objects in one domain are seen by the outside as one entity.
This assumption is reasonable, since we have only one user (the stakeholder)
in each domain.
Since there is no central security administration, it must be assumed that
each stakeholder has its own security policy. This heterogeneity includes also
dierent preferences for cryptographic algorithms and protocols to achieve
the same security goal. Thus, for each interaction between domains, a secu-
rity context has to be negotiated between the stakeholders. Such a negotia-
tion must be supported by the security architecture and the middleware (i.e.,
CORBA). Since CORBA provides some security functionality, which we strive
to use whenever possible in our security architecture for TINA, we introduce
and analyse CORBA security in the next section and later on return to our
security architecture.
4 CORBA SECURITY
The CORBA Security specication (OMG 1995 2) has been released by the
OMG to provide the model and the architecture for security in CORBA sys-
tems. Besides the general model it species the security facilities and interfaces
available to application developers, security administrators, and implementors
of secure CORBA systems. It touches on the problem of secure interoperability
between dierent CORBA implementations, although this issue is discussed in
more detail by a companion document, the Common Secure Interoperability
specication (OMG 1996).
The CORBA Security specication denes security to be a compound no-
tion that is concerned with condentiality and integrity of information, ac-
countability of the users for their actions, and availability of the system. The
latter is not covered in the document later on.
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Security is enforced using security functionality built into the system. The
CORBA Security specication denes the following security functionality:
 Identication and authentication of principals to verify they are who
they claim to be.
 Authorization and access control to decide whether a principal can
access an object.
 Security auditing to make principals accountable for their security re-
lated actions. Auditing mechanisms are coupled with authentication func-
tions in order to be able to identify the principal correctly.
 Secure communication between objects, which requires the establish-
ment of security associations between clients and targets objects, and
integrity and/or condentiality protection of messages in transit be-
tween them.
 Non-repudiation to provide evidence of actions such as proof of origin
or receipt of data.
 Administration of security information.
Most of these security functions are performed during a secure object in-
vocation, which is the basic notion of the specication (Figure 4). Each se-
cure object invocation requires an established security association between
the client and the target object. The security association is established by
authentication between the client and the target, making the client's security
attributes (identity and privileges) available at the target side, and estab-
lishing the security context that will be used when protecting messages in
transit between the client and the target object. The way of establishing a
security association (e.g., whether simple client to target authentication or
mutual authentication is used) depends on the security policies that govern
both the client and the target object. Associations will normally persist for
many interactions.
For each object invocation, the request from the client to the target ob-
ject is subject to access control. Access control may take place at the client
side, the target side, or both sides according to the access control policy. The
access decision (i.e., whether this client can perform this operation on this
target object) is based on the client's security attributes, the target's control
attributes (e.g., access control list), and other relevant information about the
action (e.g., the operation and data) and about the context (e.g., the current
time). This general model enables a large variety of access control schemes,
ranging from access control lists, over capabilities, to label based schemes.
The scale of access control is not specied, but it can be assumed that imple-
mentors will provide access control down to the granularity of operations.
In many cases, objects perform operations on behalf of the initiator of a
chain of object invocations. In such cases, the initiator, which can be a human
user or a system entity, needs to delegate some or all of its privilege attributes
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Figure 4 Secure Object Invocation in CORBA
to the intermediate objects that will act on its behalf. The CORBA Security
specication is very general and enables virtually all kinds of delegation mod-
els (simple, composite, combined and traced delegation). The actual type of
delegation is selected according to the delegation policy either by the ORB
system automatically, or by applications via well dened interfaces.
Depending on the security policy, the integrity and/or condentiality of
the messages between the client and the target object may be protected,
and optionally non-repudiation may be provided by cryptographic means.
For the detection of actual or attempted security violations, security auditing
is performed. Depending on the implementation, recording security relevant
events may involve writing event information to a log, and/or generating an
alarm. Audit policies specify which events should be audited under which
circumstances.
A distributed object system may consist of a huge amount of objects with
a possibly even larger amount of security associations between them. This
fact raises the issue of scalability. In order to cope with the scalability prob-
lem, the notion of domains is introduced. Three types of domains with regard
to security are dened by the CORBA Security specication: security policy
domains, security environment domains, and security technology domains. A
security policy domain is the scope over which a security policy is enforced.
A security policy domain is administered by a single security authority. A
security environment domain is a domain in which the enforcement of the se-
curity policy is achieved by local means (e.g., objects on the same machine).
The security technology domain is a set of objects for which the same secu-
rity technology (e.g., Kerberos (Neuman and Ts'o 1994)) is used to provide
security.
Each security domain contains a domain manager object that references
the valid security policy objects for that domain. A security policy object
is the representation of a security policy (e.g., access control, delegation, se-
cure invocation, or audit policy), which is dened and managed by the security
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administrator of the domain. Upon the creation of an object, the ORB implic-
itly associates the object with one or more security domains according to the
construction policy (the objects can be moved between domains later on) and
then transparently enforces the security policies of those domains. In this way,
security is provided to all applications, even to those that are unaware of it.
Additional security measures may be enforced by the applications themselves.
This may be done by additional enforcement of administrator dened policies,
and/or direct use of security features (e.g., non-repudiation) via application
interfaces. The security measures enforced by the applications cannot over-
ride the security policies dened by the administrator. The rationale behind
these two levels of security is the fact that in the general case, application
developers cannot be expected to be aware of all the threats to which the
system will be subject, and to put the right countermeasures in place. On the
other hand, there are mission critical applications (e.g., in the banking or the
telecommunications world) that require the application programmer to have
more control over security.
The security functionality described above (i.e., authentication, access con-
trol, message protection, auditing, etc.) is provided by ORB security services
that may rely on some underlying security technology, which itself may use
operating system mechanisms and additional security hardware (Figure 5).
During secure object invocations, the ORB intercepts the requests and replies
between the client and the target object and calls the appropriate security
services. Some of the security services can be invoked by the applications
directly, to enforce their own security preferences. An important aspect of
this architecture is that the components that implement the security ser-
vices are independent of any specic security technology. The specication
allows the use of an isolating interface (e.g., GSS-API (IETF 1993)) between
this level and the security technology, allowing dierent security technologies
to be accommodated within the architecture, such as technologies based on
operating system protection mechanisms, existing security components (e.g.,
cryptographic libraries), or a set of distributed security services.
The specication of secure interoperability between dierent CORBA im-
plementations extends the CORBA 2.0 standard. A new protocol, the Secure
Inter-ORB Protocol (SECIOP) is specied, which enables secure interactions
of clients and target objects that reside on dierent ORBs, as long as the
same security technology is used on both sides. The information, which secu-
rity technology an object supports is part of the interoperable object reference
(IOR). Based on the information in the IOR, a security context acceptable
for both sides can be established. The establishment of the security associa-
tion and the protection of messages are controlled by security tokens that are
added to the inter-ORB protocols. Key management is not explicitly dealt
with in the CORBA Security specication.
The Common Secure Interoperability document (OMG 1996) species the
use of the protocols of three security technologies within SECIOP, namely
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Figure 5 Model of Security in CORBA
SPKM, Kerberos, and the ECMA security protocol. If the interoperability
between the ORBs is based on DCE (OSF 1992), then the DCE security
technology (X/Open 1994) based on the Kerberos protocols can also be used.
A recent addendum (OMG 1997) allows also the Secure Socket Layer (SSL)
(Netscape 1996) to be the basis of inter-ORB security.
5 THE CRYSTINA SECURITY ARCHITECTURE
Security features in TINA are implemented at various levels. In our approach,
the DPE oers general security functionality to the applications on each DPE
node as part of the DPE functionality. To ease integration in applications, as
much functionality as possible should be provided as self-contained DPE secu-
rity services. However, the DPE should also provide lower level DPE security
mechanisms to the applications for handling application specic security tasks.
The layering of the security functionality is illustrated in Figure 6. The DPE
security services are exclusively based on the DPE security mechanisms. The
implementation of these mechanisms may directly use cryptographic mecha-
nisms or may be built on available higher level security technology, such as
Kerberos. The underlying security technology may use the same cryptographic
mechanisms as the DPE security mechanisms or proprietary implementations.
The use of cryptographic mechanisms and/or higher level security technology
may be accomplished through standardized interfaces (e.g., GSS-API) to fa-
cilitate the integration of existing products into the DPE. Above the DPE
level, there are special security services, which also rely exclusively on the
DPE security services and mechanisms. They are used by TINA applications,
but are applications themselves. The special security services are not imple-
mented on each DPE node. Examples are electronic cash support or notary
services.
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Since the TINA DPE is provided by CORBA products, a natural starting
point for the TINA security architecture is the CORBA Security specica-
tion. The generality of the CORBA Security specication makes it suitable
to be the basis of security for a broad spectrum of business applications. In
some respects, it is even more general than required, and it is questionable
whether this rich functionality is necessary for certain families of applications,
such as telecommunication services based on the TINA architecture. Let us
consider, for instance, the access control schemes and delegation models de-
scribed in the CORBA Security specication. TINA service components are
implemented as TINA COs or CO groups. TINA COs may have multiple in-
terfaces, as opposed to CORBA objects, which have exactly one interface. We
assume that each interface of a TINA CO will be implemented by a dedi-
cated CORBA object, and thus each TINA CO will be realized as a set of
CORBA objects (Kitson 1995). Since the functionality oered by a TINA CO
is structured into interfaces according to the coherence of subfunctionalities,
access control to a TINA CO can be applied at the granularity of TINA CO
interfaces, which means that we only need to control access to whole CORBA
objects. Furthermore, TINA service components always act on behalf of the
stakeholder that owns them, therefore it is sucient to support identity based
access control schemes at the target side and no delegation is required.
For other aspects, secure interoperability provided by CORBA security may
not be sucient for the TINA architecture. Secure interoperation between ob-
jects depends on the membership of the objects to security policy domains,
security technology domains and ORB technology domains. We assume that
each TINA administrative domain is mapped onto one security policy domain
and one ORB technology domain, and that each boundary between TINA ad-
ministrative domains is also a boundary between security technology domains
(Staamann et al. 1997). The latter reects that stakeholders with various
kinds of customer premises equipment, varying priorities regarding security,
and under possibly dierent national laws cannot be assumed to have the
same security technologies. Interoperability between objects in dierent se-
curity policy domains can, thus, only be achieved if both domains agree on
a common security policy for the respective interactions. This common se-
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curity policy can be negotiated at invocation time or in advance. Objects in
dierent ORB technology domains can interact securely using the SECIOP,
as long as the same security technology is used at both sides. According to
the CORBA Security specication, interaction of objects in dierent security
technology domains (e.g., objects belonging to dierent stakeholders in dif-
ferent countries) requires a security technology gateway. However, this may
cause a trust problem, because such a gateway cannot be realized without the
administrators of both security domains trusting each other or a third party
that runs the gateway. A less restrictive solution that is not supported by
CORBA would be to negotiate the security technology, as well.
Below in Figure 7, we present our model of security for distributed ob-
ject based telecommunication architectures, such as TINA, that is based on
the CORBA Security specication with some modications according to the
observations above.
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Figure 7 CrySTINA Model of Security
When a client invokes an operation on a target object, a request and in most
cases a reply are passed between them. According to the CORBA Security
specication and based on the observation of various CORBA implementa-
tions, we assume that the request and the reply can be intercepted at two
levels: at the request level, where we have access to the request and the reply
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as structured data, and at the message level, where the request and the reply
are available as an unstructured buer containing the respective messages in
a serialized form. These two levels of interceptions are very well adapted to
support the enforcement of security, since some of the security services (e.g.,
access control) can best be performed on structured requests where the infor-
mation about the involved principals and the operation is directly available,
while other security functions (e.g., encryption) can more naturally be applied
to unstructured raw data.
Each request is intercepted by the request level interceptor at the client side.
If there is no security association established between this client and target
object, then the Security Association Setup Service is called and a security
association is established between them. This means mutual authentication,
security policy negotiation, and exchange of security related parameters (e.g.,
cryptographic keys, initialization vectors, etc.). The Security Association Ser-
vice uses the identity information of the stakeholder that owns the client in
the authentication process. Based on the authenticated identity of the client,
access control on the target object can be performed in this phase. If the
access is not allowed, then the association is not established at all, and the
client is notied (e.g, an exception is raised). An established security associ-
ation is represented by security context information on both sides. Then the
request is processed further according to the negotiated security policy (e.g.,
the Non-repudiation Service is called, if it is mandated).
On its way to the network, the request is intercepted by the message level
interceptor as well, which calls the Secure Invocation Service. According to
the negotiated security policy, integrity and/or condentiality protection is
applied using the security context information established before. The request
is then passed to the ORB Core, which transfers it to the target side. At the
target side, the applied services are called in reverse order (with the exception
of the Security Association Setup Service, since the association has already
been established).
Each service can call the Audit Service, if an event occurs that should be
audited (e.g., an integrity violation has been detected). The placement of
Security Management Services at the edge of the ORB system indicates that
these services are usually called by management applications on behalf of the
security administrator.
6 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MODEL
In the following, we discuss an object-oriented implementation of the model
described above. Figure 8 shows this implementation. The Security Associa-
tion Setup Service, the Audit Service, and the Security Management Services
are realized by a Domain Security Manager object as an independent CORBA
service. The Domain Security Manager object provides interfaces
16
 to applications, through which they can request the setup of new security
associations, get established context information, and set security prefer-
ences that are not conicting with the domain security policy,
 to other Domain Security Manager objects, through which they can au-
thenticate each other, negotiate policies and exchange keys, and
 to management applications, through which they can manage credential
and policy objects.
The Domain Security Manager object is unique in each domain and available
to all applications in the domain. The established security association between
a client and a target object is represented by the Security Context objects at
the client and the target side that are local to the client and the target. These
Context objects contain all the information of the association and provide the
Secure Invocation and Non-repudiation Services. Access control is performed
explicitly at association setup time, therefore it does not have to be performed
by the Context objects. Access control is implicitly provided for each invoca-
tion within a security association by the identication of the client. In order
to identify the right local Context object that should be applied to handle
the current invocation, we require a Local Context Manager object, which
manages the various local Contexts. The Local Context Manager requests
the association establishment and downloads the context information from
the Domain Security Manager. The Context and the Local Context Manager
objects are not CORBA objects, they do not have visible interfaces.
Let us now look again and in more detail at how this implementation real-
izes the CrySTINA model by tracing a secure object invocation. The client's
request is intercepted by the request level interceptor at the client side. This
interceptor invokes the Local Context Manager to obtain the context that
should be applied to the request. If there is a context already established
between this client and target, then the Local Context Manager returns a ref-
erence to it. If there is no such context, then the Local Context Manager calls
the Domain Security Manager to establish one. The Domain Security Manager
object uses the identity information of the stakeholder that ownes the client
in the context establishment process. This information is stored in the Cre-
dentials object. Once the context is established, the Local Context Manager
downloads it, and returns a reference for it to the request level interceptors.
Explicit access control is performed by the Domain Security Manager in the
association establishment phase. Access is allowed or denied at object granu-
larity level. If access is allowed, then the association is established between the
client and the target, and the Local Context Manager returns a reference to
the appropriate Context object; otherwise no association is established, and
the Local Context Manager raises an exception. When the request level inter-
ceptor obtains the reference to the Context object, it calls it with the request
as the parameter. The Context object will perform the required services on
the request (e.g., non-repudiation of origin) according to the security policy.
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Figure 8 Implementation of the CrySTINA Model
Then, the request is passed on and it is intercepted by the message level
interceptor. This interceptor already knows which Context to apply, and it can
call this Context object with the message as the parameter. Note, that at this
level we have access to the message as an unstructured stream of bytes, so the
Context object can easily perform the Secure Invocation Services, according
to the security policy. The last step is to put a special security header at
the beginning of the message that contains the necessary information for the
target side message level interceptor to identify which context it should use to
reclaim the message. Then the protected message is passed to the ORB Core
that sends it to the target.
At the target side, the incoming message is intercepted by the message level
interceptor. This interceptor interprets the security header, and calls the Local
Context Manager with the parameters found in the security header (e.g., a
context ID) to obtain a reference to the Context object that should be used
for this message. If the context is already available (i.e., this is not the rst
message from the given client), then a reference to it is returned by the Local
Context Manager, otherwise the Local Context Manager rst downloads the
context from the Domain Security Manager, and then passes the reference
to the interceptor. Note, that the context is already available at the Domain
Security Manager, because the association is already established between the
client and the target by the time when the message arrives at the target.
When the message level interceptor receives the reference to the appropriate
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Context object, it calls it with the message as the parameter. The Context
object reclaims the original clear message.
In the next step, the request is intercepted by the request level interceptor.
The interceptor already knows which Context to apply for this request, and it
can call this Context object with the request as the parameter. The Context
object performs the appropriate operations (e.g., non-repudiation of origin)
on the request. The fact that the request arrived at the target side request
level interceptor already means that access is allowed. Finally the request is
passed to the target object.
The reply is handled in a similar way. The dierence is that the interceptors
already know which context to apply because they have temporarily stored
this information when handling the request.
7 CONCLUSION
We introduced the TINA-C architecture, an open architecture for telecom-
munication services ranging from teleconferencing over video-on-demand to
electronic commerce. We provided an analysis of the security problem domain
in this architecture. As a result of this analysis, we allocated the necessary se-
curity functionality to each administrative domain and within the domain to
the middleware layer (DPE), which is basically provided by CORBA products.
CrySTINA, our security architecture for TINA, was presented. Because of its
allocation to the middleware layer, the implementation of our architecture is
closely related to CORBA security. Unlike the CORBA security architecture,
CrySTINA can cope with the heterogeneity of security policies and security
technologies, which must be expected as a side eect of the self-administration
of the administrative domains in TINA. This is achieved by the negotiation of
security contexts. Our future work will be concerned with the generalization
of CrySTINA's negotiation concept to CORBA as a general middleware plat-
form. Ongoing work is concerned with the prototypical implementation of the
concept using a commercial ORB product (Orbix 1997) and a free CORBA
implementation (Brose 1997).
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